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Abstract—Direct Acyclic Graph (DAG) based blockchain and
the corresponding consensus mechanism has been identified as
a promising technology for Internet of Things (IoT). Compared
with Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) that have
been widely used in the existing blockchains, the consensus
mechanism designed based on DAG architecture (simply called
as DAG consensus) can overcome some shortcomings such as
high resource consumption, high transaction fee, low transaction
throughput and long confirmation delay. However, the theoretic
analysis on the DAG consensus is an untapped venue to be
explored. To this end, based on one of the most typical DAG
consensuses, Tangle, we investigate the impact of network load on
the blockchain performance and security. Considering unsteady
network load, we first propose a Markov chain model to capture
the behavior of DAG consensus process under dynamic load con-
ditions. The key performance metrics, i.e., cumulative weight and
confirmation delay are analysed based on the proposed model.
Then, we leverage a stochastic model to analyse the probability
of a successful double-spending attack in different network load
regimes. The results can provide insightful understanding of
DAG consensus process, e.g., how the network load affects the
confirmation delay and the probability of a successful attack.
Meanwhile, we also demonstrate the trade-off between security
level and confirmation delay, which can act as a guidance for
practical deployment of DAG based blockchain systems.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Internet of Things, Consensus
Mechanism, Direct Acyclic Graph, Tangle, Network load, Double-
spending.
I. INTRODUCTION
BLOCKCHAIN is a distributed ledger technology forestablishing trust and consensus in peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks. It is originally proposed in 2009 as the fundamental
technology of crypto-currency, Bitcoin [1]. The decentraliza-
tion provided by blockchain can be largely attributed to its
consensus mechanism, which enables peer-to-peer trading in
a distributed manner and leverages the computational power
of whole network to ensure the immutability of the stored
data. As such a safe decentralization solution, blockchain has
been identified as a most promising technology to support the
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future digital society, and attracted much attention from both
industry and academia.
Recently, blockchain has shown a great potential to be used
in the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems, such as smart vehi-
cles [2], energy trading [3], and supply chain [4]. Blockchain
comes with characteristics of decentralization, high security,
interoperation, and trust building, which can solve the problem
of high cost of infrastructure and maintenance in the traditional
centralized IoT systems. According to IBM report [5], to be
safe, scalable and efficient, the centralized IoT cloud systems
will be transformed to blockchain enabled decentralized sys-
tems by 2025.
It is well-known that consensus mechanism plays a key
role to establish a blockchain enabled IoT system, which
motivates the nodes in the network to efficiently and securely
insert the new block into the chain [6]. Considering the
IoT systems are typically resource-limited and large-scale,
the consensus mechanism adopted in IoT systems must be
resource efficiency, low cost and can support high transaction
throughput. To this end, we first review the main ideas of two
widely used consensus mechanisms in blockchain and discuss
their viability for IoT systems.
Proof-of-Work (PoW) based consensus mechanism [7]:
The core idea of PoW is the competition of computational
power. The miners constantly perform hash algorithm to
compete for the right to generate the new block with bonus.
The winner is the first miner who obtains a hash value
that is lower than the announced target. On the one hand,
the computational complexity in PoW must be high enough
for preventing forking. But on the other hand, the high
computational complexity would cause the deteriorated and
meaningless energy consumption.
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based consensus mechanism [8]:
Unlike PoW that relies on computing capability, coin age is
used in PoS to avoid the high computational cost of hash
operation. The coin age of an unspent asset is defined as its
value multiplied by the time period after it was created. In PoS,
a higher coin age will result in a higher probability to obtain
the right of creating a new block, and in turn the coin age
would be consumed (reset as zero) when the winner receives
rewards. Since the probability to win is directly determined
by coin age, PoS is beneficial to the wealthy miner, and
might cause monopoly, which may result in the generation
of powerful third party.
Both PoW and PoS work on a “single chain” architecture,
where forking is illegal [7]. To reduce the probability of
forking and maintain a single version of blockchain ledger
among all nodes in the network, the consensus mechanism
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
10
92
5v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
19
2100 101 102 103
1
20
40
60
80
100
120
Time (second) in log scale
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
w
ei
gh
t
 
 
High arrival rate, λ=10
Low arrival rate, λ=0.1
Fig. 1: Consensus process of a new transaction
must slow down the generation rate of new blocks. This design
principle causes some bottlenecks of applying blockchain to
IoT systems as follows. (i) Resource consumption: the two
consensus mechanism need much computational power or
coinage, which is too costly for IoT systems deployment.
(ii) High Transaction fee: high resource consumption leads
to professional and powerful miners. It is a heavy burden
to feedback the miners in the IoT systems with frequent
micropayments. (iii) Throughput limitation: the capacity and
the generation rate of blocks are limited, thus, the transaction
throughput is usually limited to dozens, e.g., 7 TPS in Bitcoin
[1] and 20 to 30 TPS in Ethereum [9], which is unable to
respond to the exponential growth of IoT devices and needs.
(iv) Confirmation delay: the confirmation delay is too long for
IoT applications, e.g., 60 minutes in Bitcoin and 3 minutes in
Ethereum.
To overcome the above shortcomings of PoW and PoS,
DAG consensus is originally proposed in [10] and allows any
node to insert a new block into the ledger immediately, as long
as they process the earlier transactions. In this way, many fork-
ings would be generated simultaneously. This phenomenon
is regarded as a problem in many traditional consensus pro-
cess since it would cause “double-spending” [11]. However,
DAG consensuses use some effective algorithms (e.g., Markov
Chain Monte Carlo algorithm [12] and virtual voting algorithm
[14]) to address double-spending problem and allow new
arrival transactions access the blockchain network in a forking
topology. As a result, the confirmation rate and transaction
throughput in DAG consensus process will not be limited
anymore. Moreover, unlike the single chain design in PoW or
PoS, the data stored in DAG is protected by massive forking
blocks, thus, the average resource consumption on each node
could be very low. Accordingly, the professional miner is not
necessary and low or no transaction fee is possible, which is
critical to IoT ecosystems.
Despite many advantages for IoT, DAG consensus also faces
some challenges. In practical IoT systems, it is impossible
that the new transaction arrives quickly and steadily all the
time. When the transaction arrival rate becomes low, the
confirmation delay will increase significantly since the earlier
transactions must wait for the new transactions to process. In
[12], the growth curves of cumulative weight in high load and
low load regimes are analysed, which are shown in Fig. 1,
where λ represents transaction arrival rate (transactions per
second). The cumulative weight relates to confirmation level,
and when it reaches the defined threshold, the transaction is
confirmed. We can see that the growth rate of cumulative
weight in low load regime is much lower than that in high
load regime, which will result in a long confirmation delay.
In fact, the network load is determined by transaction arrival
rate which could be fluctuant in practical IoT systems. In such
an unsteady load regime, the performance of DAG consensus
process becomes more complicated. Moreover, the network
load will also affect the security of system, where a lower
load will result in less cumulative blocks, and thus lead to a
higher probability of a successful double-spending attack.
Inspired by these observations, this paper aims to investigate
the impact of network load on the system performance and
security in DAG consensus in an analytical manner. First,
we introduce a Markov chain model to capture the impact of
network load on the performance of DAG consensus process
in terms of cumulative weight growth rate and confirmation
delay. Then, we formulate attack strategies and leverage a
stochastic model to examine the probability of a successful
double-spending attack in different network load regimes.
The analytical models and results can provide an insightful
understanding of the performance and security in the DAG
consensus. The main contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows.
• We point out the impact of network load on the perfor-
mance and security of DAG consensus. By classifying
four network load regimes, we reflect this impact in a
qualitative and quantitative manner.
• Considering the characteristics of fluctuant network load
in practical IoT contexts, we propose Markov chain
model for DAG consensus process and capture the dy-
namic changing of the load mathematically. The proposed
model demonstrates the relationship between the action
of nodes in DAG network and the corresponding influ-
ence to system performance, which offers an insightful
observation of DAG consensus process.
• We examine the attack strategy based on network load
using a stochastic model, and derive the expression of
the probability to conduct a successful double-spending
attack. The equations can indicate the required computa-
tional power of attacker for double-spending in different
load regimes. This analysis clearly explains the malicious
action of attacker, and thus serves as a theoretical guid-
ance to protect the honest transactions.
• Through extensive experiments, we validate our analysis
and obtain insightful results: (i) when the network load
changes from high to low, the confirmation delay will be
very long (say longer than low load regime). In contrast,
when the load changes from low to high, the confirmation
happens very fast. (ii) the adaptation period (introduced in
section IV) in consensus process can be used to increase
the probability of a successful attack. (iii) the trade-off
between security level and confirmation delay can provide
a guideline to find a suitable confirmation threshold for
blockchain protocol design.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
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Fig. 2: An example of consensus process in Tangle
provides some basic principles in DAG based blockchain. Sec-
tion III we introduce the Markov chain model for consensus
process. Based on the proposed model, Section IV analyses
the performance in terms of cumulative weight growth and
confirmation delay under different network load regimes.
Section V introduces the double-spending attack in Tangle,
and use a stochastic model to study the attack process. In
Section VI, we examine the attack strategy in DAG consensus
process and obtain the probability of a successful attack under
different network load regimes. Section VII conducts some
experiments for comparisons and discussions. Section VIII
reviews some related work, and finally, Section IX concludes
the whole paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Basic Principles
The principle of DAG consensus is to attach the new
transactions in a forking topology. Under such design, there
are several proposed consensus mechanisms, such as Tangle
[12], Byteball [13] and Hashgraph [14]. Among them, Tangle
is the first proposed one that has attracted much attention in
IoT field, and it has the highest market capitalization in DAG
based blockchains [15]. Therefore, we adopt it as a typical
example to examine DAG consensus process in this paper.
Tangle is the mathematical foundation of IOTA, a cryp-
tocurrency for the IoT industry [12]. As a DAG based ledger
for recording transactions, Tangle allows different branches to
eventually merge into the chain, and thus leads to a much
higher overall throughput compared with PoW and PoS based
mechanisms. In Tangle, to access the network as a new block,
any new transaction has to approve a number of earlier transac-
tions (typically two [12]). Thanks to this, the higher transaction
arrival rate, the faster transactions can be confirmed. Moreover,
since the workload to create a new block is light, the powerful
professional miners are not necessary in Tangle. As a result, all
nodes can issue their own transactions without transaction fee.
This is critical to the IoT applications, since micro-payments
are typical trading scenarios. Some basic concepts in Tangle
are listed as follows, and also illustrated in Fig. 2.
Block: all the blocks in Fig. 2 are the storage units to record
information including transaction, digital signature, and hash
value. Since one block records one transaction in Tangle, a
block can be simply called as a transaction. Tip: it is the
transaction (or block) which has not been approved yet. Direct
approval and indirect approval: as shown in Fig. 2, each
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Fig. 3: Longest chain in PoW vs. Heaviest Tangle in DAG consensus
edge represents an approval, a direct edge indicates the direct
approval, and a path between two transactions with multi-hop
indicates the indirect approval. Own weight: the own weight
of a transaction is proportional to the amount of work which
is put in by its issuer. Cumulative weight: it is the sum of a
transaction’s own weight and the overall own weights of the
transactions that directly or indirectly approve it. Cumulative
weight stands for the confirmation level of a transaction in
Tangle network.
B. Consensus Process
To issue a new transaction and let the other nodes accept
it (i.e., reach an agreement for the consensus), the main
procedures are listed as follows. (i) A node creates a storage
unit to store the new transaction. (ii) The node selects two
tips with no-conflict according to Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) tips selection algorithm [12], and adds the hash of
the selected tips into its storage unit. (iii) The node finds a
nonce to solve a cryptographic puzzle to meet the difficulty
target, which is similar to PoW but with a very low difficulty-
of-work for avoiding spamming. (iv) The node uses its private
key to sign the new transaction and broadcasts it to others. (v)
When the other nodes receive it, they check whether it is legal
or not based on the digital signature and nonce. For simplicity
of later analysis, we define procedures (i) to (v) as the reveal
stage of a new transaction.
After that, the successfully checked new transaction will
be added as a new tip in DAG based ledger, and then wait
for confirmation through direct approval and indirect approval
of subsequent transactions till its cumulative weight reaches
the defined threshold. This process is defined as the weight
accumulation stage of a new transaction.
C. Forking Problem and the Solution
In blockchain, building forking to redo the work is the
only way to tamper the data stored in the public ledger.
Therefore, to address forking for security, the single chain
4λhr(λhr−1)
(r + λhr)(r + λhr − 1)×0︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(t)+1
+
2rλhr
(r + λhr)(r + λhr − 1)×1︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(t)+0
+
r(r − 1)
(r + λhr)(r + λhr − 1)×2︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(t)-1
=
2r
r + λhr
(1)
based blockchain (e.g., Bitcoin) uses the longest chain as the
criterion, which is shown in Fig. 3. To maximize its profit, a
rational miner should work on the longest chain when forking
occurs, since the longest chain has the lowest probability to be
orphaned [7]. In Tangle, although DAG based forking topology
can support a high performance in consensus process, the
forking also should be limited into a reasonable scale for
preventing double-spending. Similar with Bitcoin, IOTA uses
the heaviest Tangle to address forking problem (sub-Tangle).
To this end, a rational node in DAG network should use the
MCMC tip selection algorithm to extend the heaviest Tangle,
which has the highest overall cumulative weight. Meanwhile,
the sub-Tangle with less overall cumulative weight will not
be approved by new transactions gradually. In summary, the
honest miners in Bitcoin and the honest nodes in Tangle use
its own computational power to prevent data from tampering.
III. MARKOV CHAIN MODEL FOR CONSENSUS PROCESS
In this section, we propose a Markov chain model to
analyse the consensus process of an observed transaction under
unsteady network load regimes.
A. System Model
Recall we have divided the consensus process of an ob-
served transaction in Tangle into two stages: reveal stage
and weight accumulation stage. Reveal stage is to attach
the observed transaction into DAG based ledger, so that the
transaction can be seen by all nodes. Let the average duration
time in reveal stage be hr, which is determined by the com-
putation and transmission time. In weight accumulation stage,
the cumulative weight of the observed transaction increases
from its own weight to confirmation threshold (denoted by m)
gradually. Without loss of generality, we normalize the average
own weight of each transaction into 1, and thus the cumulative
weight of the observed transaction is 1 plus the overall number
of transactions that directly or indirectly approve it.
Considering the nodes in Tangle system are roughly in-
dependently distributed in a large scale IoT network, it is
reasonable to assume the new transaction arrival follows Pois-
son process. Let λ be the arrival rate of the new transactions
issued by the honest nodes. When a new transaction arrives,
it will select two tips using MCMC algorithm. The principle
of MCMC algorithm is to independently place some particles
on the old transactions of Tangle ledger and let these particles
perform random walks towards the tips. To orphan the sub-
Tangle, the particles prefer to go through the transactions with
a higher cumulative weight. Since the difference of cumulative
weight among neighbouring transactions in the heaviest Tangle
is very small, we can approximatively consider that each tip
in the heaviest Tangle can be randomly selected by MCMC
algorithm with equal probability. On the other hand, the overall
cumulative weight of the heaviest Tangle is much larger than
that of the sub-Tangle, so that MCMC algorithm will choose
tips in the heaviest Tangle and the sub-Tangle generated by
attacker will be orphaned.
Moreover, to analyse the impact of network load, we
classify the network load into four regimes: High load Regime
(HR), Low load Regime (LR), High to Low load Regime
(H2LR) and Low to High load Regime (L2HR) as follows.
B. High Load Regime with Steady State
The network load (transaction arrival rate) keeps steady in
this regime. Let h = 1/λ be the average interarrival time
between two transactions. When h ≤ hr, it means that the
network load is high, and it is defined as HR. In Tangle, after
a new transaction directly approves two tips, it will be a new
tip and the selected two will be covered (they are no longer
tips and the other incoming transactions should not directly
approve them). However, when h≤hr, many new transactions
would arrive at the reveal stage of earlier transactions, and the
tips selected by earlier transactions have not been broadcast to
network. As a result, it is probable that the same tip will be
directly approved by several different transactions, and thus
the number of tips will keep steady, intuitively.
Let L(t) be the number of tips in the heaviest Tangle at time
t. According to the analysis in [12], L(t) fluctuates around
a constant value L. Based on the stability of tips, we have
L(t)=L(t−hr)=L. Meanwhile, we know that there are λhr
new transactions arrive during t−hr to t on average. As a
result, at time t, λhr new tips in L(t) will replace λhr old
tips in L(t−hr). Therefore, we can rewrite L(t) = r + λhr,
where r are the remained old tips, and λhr are the tips chosen
by the new transactions during t−hr to t (they are not tips
anymore, but other nodes do not know at this time).
Moreover, when a new transaction arrives at time t, it
would select tips randomly from L(t). Since λhr are not
tips anymore, tips selection from λhr or r would affect the
number of L(t) in the future. If the new transaction selects
zero tip in r, L(t) will increase by 1; if it selects one tip in
r, L(t) will remain unchange; otherwise, L(t) will decrease
by 1. The expected number of selected tips in r can be
calculated in equation (1). Based on the stability of L(t), we
have 2rr+λhr =1. Thus, r= λhr and L=L(t)=2λhr.
C. Low Load Regime with Steady State
Compared with HR, LR is the situation when h>hr. In this
case, when a new transaction arrives, the earlier transactions
have revealed to DAG network in expectation. Since one
transaction covers two tips, the typical number of tips in this
regime will decline, and becomes 1 finally. Note that L=2λhr
is also available in LR, where L=2λhr≈1 based on h>hr.
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Fig. 4: Markov Chain model for the consensus process of an observed
transaction under H2LR.
D. High to Low Load Regime with Unsteady State
The consensus process of an observed transaction in steady
regime (i.e., HR and LR) have been explored in [12]. In this
paper, we focus on the consensus process in unsteady state.
The transaction arrival rate is steady in HR and LR, which
can be denoted by λh and λl, respectively. When the new
transaction arrival rate changes from λh to λl suddenly, it
is an unsteady state and defined as H2LR. Accordingly, the
number of tips will decrease from 2λhhr (denoted by Lh) to
2λlhr=1 gradually.
As a metric of confirmation level, let W (t) be a stochastic
process representing the cumulative weight of an observed
transaction at time t. It will increase with the approval of
new transactions over time. Meanwhile, the probability to
approve the observed transaction is affected by the number
of tips L(t) based on random selection, and L(t) is also
a stochastic process. Therefore, when the transaction arrival
rate becomes low, we can have the value of {W (t), L(t)}
at the next moment only depends on the present and is
independent of the past. Furthermore, when the transaction
arrival rate is low, we can approximatively consider that the
transactions attach to DAG network one by one. Therefore,
{W (t), L(t)} can be formulated as a discrete-time Markov
chain {W (k), L(k)}, k=0, 1, 2, ...∞, where the state changes
with the arrival of each new transaction.
The Markov chain model for an observed transaction under
H2LR is shown in Fig. 4. The initial state represents that
the observed transaction reveals to DAG network under HR,
where W (0) = 1, L(0) = Lh = 2λhhr. The observed
transaction is confirmed when W (k) =m, where m ≥ 2. In
each new transaction arrival interval, W (k) of the observed
transaction will remain the same or increase by 1 based on
the result of random selection. Since the new transaction
will choose two tips from L(k) randomly, the probability
to select the observed transaction for W (k+1) =W (k)+1
is 1L(k) × L(k)−1L(k)−1 + L(k)−1L(k) × 1L(k)−1 = 2L(k) . Alteratively, the
probability of not being selected for W (k+1) = W (k) is
L(k)−2
L(k) . When the new transaction approves two tips, it will
be a new tip and the selected two are not tips anymore. In
this case, L(k) will decrease by 1 in each arrival interval until
L(k) = 1. Especially, when L(k) reduces to 2, the observed
...1 2 m ...
   
Fig. 5: Markov Chain model for the consensus process of an observed
transaction under L2HR.
transaction will be approved by the incoming transaction with
probability 1, and thus W (k) will increase by 1 and L(k) will
decrease by 1. In the following, L(k) remains 1 and W (k)
increases linearly with speed λl. Based on above analysis, the
one-step transition probabilities can be given by
P {i+1, j−1 | i, j}=2/j, i=1, 2, · · · , Lh−1; j=2, 3, · · · , Lh,
P {i, j−1 | i, j}=1−2/j, i=1, 2, · · · , Lh−1; j=2, 3, · · · , Lh,
P {i+1, 1 | i, j}=1, i=2, 3, · · · ,∞; j=1.
(2)
We adopt the short notation, where P {i+1, j−1 | i, j} =
P {W (k + 1)= i+1, L(k + 1)=j−1 |W (k)= i, L(k)=j}.
The first equation in (2) stands for the situation that the
observed transaction has been approved by an incoming new
transaction, thus W (k+1)=W (k)+1 and L(k+1)=L(k)−1.
The second equation stands for the situation that the observed
transaction has not been approved, so W (k+1)=W (k) and
L(k+ 1) = L(k) − 1. The third indicates that H2LR has
transferred to LR. The observed transaction will be approved
by the following new transactions with probability 1, since it
has been indirectly approved by all tips.
Note that the above dissuasion is based on the worst case
under H2LR, where transaction arrival rate changes from λh to
λl as soon as the observed transaction reveals in the network
and W (0)=1. In contrast, the best case in this regime is that
transaction arrival rate changes from λh to λl when W (k)=m,
which is similar to the consensus process under HR. Moreover,
the jump point of transaction arrival rate can be extended to
any time by integrating the analysis of HR in [12] and the
proposed Markov chain model in H2LR.
E. Low to High Load Regime with Unsteady State
Compared with H2LR, L2HR happens when the arrival rate
increases from λl to λh. Accordingly, the number of tips
increases from 1 to 2λhhr gradually.
The Markov chain model for an observed transaction under
L2HR is illustrated in Fig. 5. Since the observed transaction
reveals under LR where L(0)=1, it is fully covered and will
be directly or indirectly approved by all the new transactions.
As a result, W (k) will increase linearly with speed λh
regardless of L(k). The transition probabilities under L2HR
are shown as follows.
P {W (k+1)= i+1 |W (k)= i}=1, (3)
where i=1, 2, ...∞.
Similarly, we use this model to capture the best case in
L2HR where transaction arrival rate changes from λl to λh
when W (0) = 1. In contrast, the worst case in L2HR is that
transaction arrival rate changes from λl to λh when W (k)=m,
which can be referred to the consensus process under LR.
6IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In the section, we analyse the performance of consensus
process in terms of cumulative weight and confirmation delay
respectively based on the proposed Markov chain model.
A. Cumulative Weight
HR: The growth of cumulative weight under steady states,
HR and LR, has been discussed in previous work [12]. We
briefly review this work as the preliminaries to provide fur-
ther analysis of confirmation delay and double-spending. The
cumulative weight of an observed transaction begins to grow
when the reveal stage ends. In HR, the weight accumulation
stage has two period: adaptation period and linear growth
period. The adaptation period of an observed transaction can
be thought as the time until almost all the tips indirectly
approve that transaction. The expected cumulative weight of an
observed transaction grows with E[W (t)]=2 exp(0.352t/hr)
during adaptation period [12]. Next, when the adaptation
period ends, all incoming transactions will indirectly approve
the observed transaction, and the expected cumulative weight
grows with speed λh, which is called as linear growth pe-
riod. Let t0 be the duration time of adaptation period. The
adaptation period ends when cumulative growth rate becomes
λh, namely
dE[W (t)]
dt |t=t0 = λh. Accordingly, we can obtain
t0 =
hr
0.352 × ln(Lh/1.408) and W (t0) = Lh0.704 . Hence, the
cumulative weight growth of an observed transaction in this
regime is
E[W (t)hr]=
{
2 exp(0.352t/hr), 0≤ t≤ t0,
Lh
0.704+λh(t−t0), t>t0.
(4)
LR: Since L(0)=1 in LR, the incoming new transactions
will approve the observed transaction with probability 1.
Consequently, the average cumulative weight growth rate is
λl in this regime. The expected cumulative weight in LR at
time t can be expressed as
E[W (t)lr]=1+λlt, t≥0. (5)
H2LR: As shown in Fig. 4, when 0 ≤ k ≤ Lh−1, each
column of the state transition diagram stands for all possible
states {W (k), L(k)} at a specific step k. For example, when
k=0, the possible state is {1, Lh}; when k=1, the possible
states are {1, Lh−1} and {2, Lh−1}; when k =Lh−1, the
possible states are {2, 1}, {3, 1}, ..., {Lh, 1}. In the case of
k ≥ Lh, the number of possible states will remain Lh−1.
For example, if the step moves from Lh − 1 to Lh, the
cumulative weight of all possible states will increase by 1
simultaneously, i.e., change from {2, 1}, {3, 1}, ..., {Lh, 1} to
{3, 1}, {4, 1}, ..., {Lh+1, 1}. The reason is that the observed
transaction has been indirectly approved by all tips when
k ≥Lh.
Based on this, we could obtain the expected cumulative
weight at step k in H2LR as
E[W (k)h2lr] =
∑
∀i
∑
∀j
P{W (k) = i, L(k) = j |
W (0) = 1, L(0) = Lh} × i,
(6)
where k = 0, 1, · · · ,∞, and P{W (k) = i, L(k) = j |
W (0)=1, L(0)=Lh} is the k-step transition probability
which can be calculated from equation (2). If and only if {i, j}
is a possible state at step k, the corresponding k-step transition
probability is greater than 0.
As mentioned before, the new transaction arrival is a
Poisson process. Let {Hi, i = 1, 2, ...∞} be the sequence of
interarrival times between two neighboring transactions, where
Hi, i= 1, 2, ...∞, are independent and identically distributed
exponential random variables with mean 1/λl under H2LR.
According to t=
k∑
i=1
Hi, equation (6) can be transformed as
the expected cumulative weight at time t as follows.
E[W (t)h2lr] =
∑
∀i
∑
∀j
P{W (t) = i, L(t) = j |
W (0) = 1, L(0) = Lh} × i,
(7)
where t=0, H1, H1+H2, H1+H2+H3, · · · ,∞.
L2HR: In this regime, due to L(0)= 1, all new incoming
transactions will direct and indirectly approve the observed
transaction. As a result, W (k) increases by 1 with probability
1 in each transaction arrival interval. The expected cumulative
weight with k in L2HR is
E[W (k)l2hr]=1+k, k=0, 1, 2, · · · ,∞. (8)
The expected cumulative weight in L2HR at time t can be
expressed as
E[W (t)l2hr]=1+k, t=
k∑
i=1
Hi, (9)
where t=0, H1, H1+H2, · · · ,∞.
B. Confirmation Delay
Confirmation delay is the time from W (0)=1 to W (t)=m.
HR: Let E[Thr] be the expected confirmation delay in HR.
Based on equation (4), if confirmation threshold m≤ [W (t0)],
the observed transaction will be confirmed during adaptation
period. Accordingly, we have m = 2 exp(0.352E[Thr]/hr).
Otherwise, the confirmation will happen during linear growth
period, where m= Lh0.704+λh(E[Thr]−t0). We can obtain that
E[Thr] =

hr
0.325
ln(m/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Confirmed in adaptation
, 2≤m≤ [W (t0)],
hr
0.325
ln(Lh/1.408)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time for adaptation
+
1
λh
(m− Lh
0.704
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time for liner growth
,m> [W (t0)].
(11)
LR: Let E[Tlr] be the expected confirmation delay in this
regime. Based on the cumulative weight growth of LR in
equation (5), we can obtain that
E[Tlr]=(m−1)hl, m≥2, (12)
where hl=1/λl.
H2LR: As shown in Fig. 4, there are various paths from
the initial state {1, Lh} to the confirmation state {m,L(k)}.
Among them, the green path with short dashed is the shortest
one, where the transaction will be approved by m−1 new
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Case I :
Lh−2∑
k=m−1
P{W (k−1)=m−1, L(k−1)=Lh−k+1 |W (0)=1, L(0)=Lh }× 2Lh−k+1×khl
+
m+Lh−3∑
k=Lh−1
P{W (k)=m,L(k)=1 |W (0)=1, L(0)=Lh }×khl, 2≤m<Lh,
Case II :
m+Lh−3∑
k=m−1
P{W (k)=m,L(k)=1 |W (0)=1, L(0)=Lh }×khl, m≥Lh.
(10)
1,5 1,4 1, 2
2,4 2,2 2,1
3,1
5,1
4,2
...
Valid paths to get confirmed 
Repeated confirmation path
1,3
2,3
3,3 3,2
4,1
Confirmation state when m=3
Fig. 6: Simplified Markov Chain model in H2LR; Lh = 5 and m = 3
incoming transactions with the smallest expected confirma-
tion delay. In contrast, the red path with long dashed is
the longest confirmation path that goes through m+Lh−3
new transactions. Let E[Th2lr] be the expected confirmation
delay in H2LR, which can be expressed as equation (10).
Note that 2Lh−k+1 is the probability P{W (k) = m,L(k) =
Lh−k|W (k−1)=m−1, L(k−1)=Lh−k+1}. As shown in
Fig. 6, in the case of 2 ≤ m < Lh, the consensus process
cannot go through the repeated confirmation path, according
to the definition of confirmation delay. Hence, the first line in
equation (10) is to ensure that the observed transaction reaches
confirmation though the valid pathes in Fig. 6. In the case
of m ≥ Lh, {W (k) = m,L(k) = 1} is the only state for
confirmation.
L2HR: In this regime, the cumulative weight of an observed
transaction increases by 1 with probability 1 in each transac-
tion arrival interval. The expected confirmation delay E[Tl2hr]
in L2HR can be expressed as follows.
E[Tl2hr]=E
m−1∑
i=1
Hi=(m−1)hh, m≥2, (13)
where hh=1/λh.
V. DOUBLE-SPENDING ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we first introduce the most typical double-
spending attack in Tangle. Then, we use stochastic model to
examine the probability of a successful double-spending attack
in Tangle network.
A. Attack Descriptions and Assumptions
In preliminaries, we mentioned that Tangle uses the cumu-
lative computational power of honest nodes to prevent data
from tampering, and meanwhile, the cumulative computational
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Fig. 7: Parasite chain for double-spending attack
power is proportional to cumulative weight. When the trans-
action arrival rate is low, the cumulative weight growth rate
will decrease, and it would be easy for attacker to outweigh
the cumulative weight of the branch maintained by the honest
nodes for double-spending. Moreover, as we analysed before,
the consensus process is affected by network load. Therefore,
a rational attacker would optimise its strategy by considering
network load to increase the success probability.
To systematically analyse this security problem, we intro-
duce the most typical double-spending attack in Tangle, the
parasite chain attack, which is shown in Fig. 7.
1) Let T1 be the time when the attacker sends a payment
to a merchant and the honest nodes begin to approve it.
2) Let T2 be the time when the attacker builds an offline
branch (called as parasite chain) without any honest node
knows that, which contains a transaction that conflicts
with the payment. Note that this could be acted before
T1, in an other word, T1 < T2 or T1 ≥ T2 are both
allowed (we will analyse these two cases later).
3) The attacker continually uses its computational power
to perform hash operation, and issues new transaction
to extends the parasite chain for increasing its overall
cumulative weight.
4) Let Td be the time when the payment for merchant
reaches confirmation threshold m, so the merchant sends
goods to the attacker.
5) As long as the cumulative weight of the parasite chain
outweighs the honest chain after Td, the attacker will
broadcast the parasite chain to the whole Tangle net-
work. The honest nodes will select the parasite chain
gradually based on MCMC algorithm. The payment for
merchant will be orphaned finally, but the goods (e.g., a
piece of useful message) have already been sent to the
attacker, so the double-spending attack is successful.
Next, we present the assumptions for double-spending anal-
8ysis. Assume that the process of incoming new transactions
issued by honest nodes follows a Poisson process with λ.
Assume that the time of an attacker to perform hash algorithm
to meet the targets1 is exponentially distributed having mean
1/µ [7].
Proof: according to the widely used Keccak-384 hash algo-
rithm [16], all results of hash algorithm are in (0, 2384]. As a
result, the probability to meet the target is
the number of targets
2384 − 1− hashrate× time. (14)
Considering the current hashrate of mining pool is 45EH/s
in Mar. 2019 [17], the practical hash operation progress
(hashrate × time) is still much less than 2384. Meanwhile,
since the hashrate of honest nodes and attackers in Tangle
are much less than mining pool usually, the impact of hash
operation progress on the probability to meet the target is
negligible. This means hash operation process can be treated
as memoryless.
B. Probability of A Successful Attack
Based on the previous assumption of the own weight of
each transaction is 1, the attack would be successful when the
number of transactions issued by attacker are more than that
by honest nodes after Td.
We can divide the competition process between the attacker
and honest nodes into multiple rounds. Each round depicts
the overall number of issued transactions increasing by 1.
Suppose the attacker creates a parasite chain by extending tips
at T2. The competition begins and the overall number of issued
transactions at two branch is 0 at this moment.
Let {Hi, i=1, 2, ...∞} denote the sequence of interarrival
times between two neighbouring transactions, where Hi, i=
1, 2, ...∞, are independent identically distributed exponential
random variables with mean 1/λ. Let {Aj , j=1, 2, ...∞} be
the sequence of interarrival times of transactions issued by the
attacker, where Aj , j=1, 2, ...∞, are independent identically
distributed exponential random variables with mean 1/µ.
In the first round, according to [18], we can obtain the
probability that one exponential random variable is smaller
than another as follows.
P{the transaction in round 1 is issued by honest nodes}
=P{H1<A1}= λ
λ+µ
,
(15)
P{the transaction in round 1 is issued by attacker}
=1− λ
λ+µ
=
µ
λ+µ
.
(16)
In the second round, if the first transaction is issued by
honest nodes, we have
P{the transaction in round 2 is issued by honest nodes}
=P{H2<A1−H1 |H1<A1 }=P{A1>H2+H1 |A1>H1}
=P{A1>H2}= λ
λ+µ
.
(17)
1The targets are the hash value which begin with a specified number of
zero bits announced by system.
Alternatively, if the first transaction is issued by the attacker,
we have
P{the transaction in round 2 is issued by honest nodes}
=1−P{H1−A1>A2 |H1>A1 }=1−P{H1>A1+A2 |H1>A1}
=1−P{H1>A2}= λ
λ+µ
.
(18)
Generally, in any round, we have
P{the new transaction is issued by honest nodes}
=P{Hi<Aj}= λ
λ+µ
,
(19)
P{the new transaction is issued by attacker}= µ
λ+µ
. (20)
Let the probability in (19) be p and that in (20) be q, the
attack process can be treated as independent Bernoulli trials.
Accordingly, we analyse the attack process before Td. In this
process, the attacker cannot broadcast its parasite chain even if
it outweighs the honest chain at some point, since the merchant
has not sent goods yet. Let α be the number of transactions
issued by honest nodes from T2 to Td, and N be the possible
number of transactions issued by the attacker when the honest
nodes have issued α transactions. Based on negative binomial
distribution theory [11], the probability mass function of N
can be given as
P{N=n}=
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
pαqn, α≥ 1. (21)
If N > α, the parasite chain double-spending attack will
succeed at Td. Otherwise, in order to win, the attacker should
catch up the difference of issued transactions until the parasite
chain outweighs the honest chain after Td. This event is
analogous to a Gambler’s Ruin problem [11], the attacker
should catch up the difference of α−N +1 transactions at
least, and the corresponding probability to catch up is shown
as follows,
Pc(α−N+1)=
{
(q/p)
α−N+1
, p>q and α≥ 1,
1, p≤q. (22)
In summary, the probability of a successful double-spending
attack when α≥ 1 is
P{attack succeeds}=P{N>α}+P{N ≤ α}Pc(α−N+1)
=
∞∑
n=α+1
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
pαqn+
α∑
n=0
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
pαqn(min(q/p, 1))α−n+1
=
 1−
α∑
n=0
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
(pαqn−pn−1qα+1), p>q and α≥ 1,
1, p≤q.
(23)
Especially, when α=0, the attacker should build the parasite
chain as soon as the honest payment is confirmed, and in this
case we can have T2=Td. As a result, the competition before
T2 disappears. However, in order to outweigh honest chain, the
attacker also should outpace honest nodes by 1 transaction at
least after Td. The probability of a successful attack in the
9case of α = 0 is
P{attack succeeds}=Pc(1)=
{
q/p, p>q and α=0,
1, p≤q.
(24)
By integrating equations (23) and (24), the probability of a
successful double-spending attack is
P{attack succeeds}
=

q/p, p>q and α=0,
1−
α∑
n=0
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
(pαqn−pn−1qα+1), p>q and α≥ 1,
1, p≤q,
(25)
where p=λ/(λ+µ), q=µ/(λ+µ).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyse the strategy to increase the
probability of a successful parasite chain attack on the per-
spective of attacker. Based on equation (25), the probability
of a successful attack is identically equal to 1 when p≤q (i.e.,
λ≤µ). So we only analyse the situation when p>q.
A. Attack Strategy
1) How to attach the parasite chain into Tangle: If the
attacker builds a parasite chain on earlier transactions that
have been approved by some other transactions at T2, it needs
to catch up the difference between the honest chain and its
own from the start, which is generated by the number of
transactions from the selected earlier transactions to tips. Let
the difference be β, at Td, the attacker should issue α+β+1
at least to succeed. Otherwise, after Td, the attacker should
catch up the difference of α + β − N + 1 transactions. The
corresponding probability is
Pc(α+β−N+1)=(q/p)α+β−N+1, p>q and α≥1. (26)
Especially, when α = 0, the attacker should catch up
the difference of β + 1 transactions at least after Td. The
probability of a successful attack for α=0 is Pc( β+1).
In summary, in the case of earlier transactions selection, the
probability of a successful attack is
P{attack succeeds with the difference β}
=
{
Pc( β+1), α=0
P{N>α+β}+P{N≤α+β}Pc(α+β−N+1), α≥1
=

(q/p)β+1, p>q and α=0,
1−
α+β∑
n=0
(
n+α−1
α−1
)
(pαqn−pn−β−1qα+β+1), p>q and α≥1.
(27)
As a case study, let α = 1, the results in Fig. 8 clearly
illustrate that the probability of a successful attack decreases
with β, which shows the impact of β on the attack. Moreover,
we can see that β is generated when the attacker does not
choose tips to build the parasite chain. As a result, it is a
natural option to choose tips for the attacker if possible, which
can increase the probability of a successful attack with the
minimum β.
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Fig. 8: Probability of a successful attack (log scale) vs. β
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Fig. 9: Probability of a successful attack (log scale) vs. α
2) Minimize the number of transactions of honest chain
from T2 to Td: Intuitively, when p>q, the transaction arrival
rate on the honest chain is higher than that of parasite chain,
and thus the probability of a successful attack would be
declined with the increasing of α on the honest chain from T2
to Td. Different from the previous case that shows the impact
of β, we conduct another case study to investigate the impact
of α on the probability of a successful attack based on (27),
where β = 1.
In Fig. 9, we can see that the probability of a successful
attack declines obviously with the increasing of α, the reason
is that the larger α indicates the higher cumulative weight of
honest chain and it would be safer. As a result, the attacker
should invest much more computational power against the
larger α, otherwise, it is difficult to succeed.
Therefore, the attacker should also minimize α to optimise
its attack strategy. Moreover, we know that α is determined
by the time in attack process shown in Fig. 10, and thus the
attacker can adjust its action at the right time to minimize α as
follows. Denote the number of transactions issued by honest
nodes from T1 to Td as m0, it is a constant value for a specific
attack. As shown in Fig. 10, in order to decrease α, we can
see that the duration between T1 and T2 is the less the better
when T1 ≥ T2. In contrast, it is the more the better when
T1 < T2.
However, the attacker cannot defer T2 indefinitely for de-
creasing α. By comparing Fig. 8 (the lowest value shown is
10
10−6) with Fig. 9 (the lowest value shown is 10−2), we could
notice that the decline rate of probability in Fig. 8 is faster than
that in Fig. 9, which reflects the impact of β is higher than
α. Therefore, to maximize success probability, the attacker
should first follow the strategy of building the parasite chain
on tips to minimize β, then postpone T2 to the time before
the honest payment has been indirectly approved by all the
tips. Since if T2 is later than that time, the parasite chain for
double-spending will indirectly approve the honest payment,
and the attack cannot succeed.
In summary, to launch a better parasite chain attack, the
attacker should minimize α and β by choosing the tips to build
a parasite chain at the last time before the honest payment has
been indirectly approved by all tips.
B. Adopt Attack Strategy in Different Load Regimes
Next, we analyse how to determine the strategy to increase
the probability of a successful attack according to the network
load. To distinguish the impact of network load on p and q, let
ph = λh/(λh+µ), qh = µ/(λh+µ) in HR and pl = λl/(λl+µ),
ql = µ/(λl+µ) in LR, respectively.
HR: According to the physics meaning of adaptation period
in Section IV, the attacker should build the parasite chain at
the end of adaptation period, which is the best time for T2. At
this moment, the honest payment will be indirectly approved
by all tips very soon, and the expected cumulative weight of
the honest payment at T2 is W (t0)− 1. Meanwhile, based on
the definition of α, we have α = max{m−[W (t0)]+1, 0}. Let
fh(x)= 1−
x∑
n=0
(
n+x−1
x−1
)
(pxhq
n
h−pn−1h qx+1h ), we can obtain
the probability of a successful attack in HR based on equation
(25), which is expressed as follows.
P{attack succeeds in HR}
=
 qh/ph, ph>qh and 2≤m< [W (t0)],fh(m−[W (t0)]+1), ph>qh and m≥ [W (t0)],
1, ph≤qh.
(28)
LR: As mentioned before, the DAG based ledger can be
treated as a single chain since L(0) = 1 in this regime.
The honest payment is indirectly approved by all tips at T1.
According to the analysis of attack strategy, we can know the
best T2 in LR is T2=T1. However, since the honest payment
is the only tip as soon as it reveals, the attacker can only attach
the parasite chain before it, and thus the best case is β = 1.
Meanwhile, since the own weight of honest payment is 1, we
can obtain that α=m−1. Based on m≥ 2, we have α≥ 1.
Using equation (27), the probability of a successful attack in
LR is
P{attack succeeds in LR}
=
 1−
m∑
n=0
(
n+m−2
m−2
)
(pm−1l q
n
l −pn−2l qm+1l ), pl>ql,
1, pl≤ql.
(29)
H2LR: In this regime, the number of tips would decrease
from L(0) = Lh = 2λhhr to L(k) = 1 finally. The honest
payment will be indirectly approved by all tips when the
0
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m0
¦
0
T1 
T2 Td
¦
When T1ŐT2
When T1ψT2
m0
Fig. 10: The influence of T1 and T2 on α
number of tips becomes 2, and the attacker should build the
parasite chain at this moment. According to the Markov chain
in Fig. 4, we can obtain the possible states of the honest
payment at T2 is {W (Lh− 2) = i, L(Lh− 2) = 2}, where
i=1, 2, · · · , Lh−1. Accordingly, after T2, the honest payment
needs max{m−i, 0} approvals at least to reach confirmation
threshold m, which means α = max{m− i, 0}. Based on
equation (25), the probability of a successful attack in H2LR
can be expressed as
P{attack succeeds in H2LR}
=

m−1∑
i=1
P{i,2}×fl(m−i)+
Lh−1∑
i=m
P{i,2}×ql/pl, pl>ql, 2≤m<Lh,
Lh−1∑
i=1
P{i,2}×fl(m−i), pl>ql,m≥Lh,
1 pl≤ql,
(30)
where fl(x) = 1−
x∑
n=0
(
n+x−1
x−1
)
(pxl q
n
l − pn−1l qx+1l ) and
P{i,2} = P {W (Lh−2)= i, L(Lh−2)=2 |W (0)=1, L(0)=Lh },
i=1, 2, · · · , Lh − 1.
Note that it is very difficult to capture the probability
distribution function of cumulative weight in HR due to too
many possible states of covered transactions in this regime.
Therefore, we use the expected value W (t0) to evaluate the
probability of a successful attack in HR. In contrast, since
the distribution function of cumulative weight in H2LR can
be calculated from Fig. 4, we have used it to analyse the
probability of a successful attack shown in equation (30),
which is different from HR.
In order to show the accuracy of the analysis using expected
value, we conduct a case study to compare the analytical
results based on expected value and distribution function in
H2LR. Compared with (30) that is based on distribution func-
tion, the probability of a successful attack based on expected
value in H2LR is
P{attack succeeds using expected value}
=
 ql/pl, pl>ql and 2≤m<W0,fl(m−W0), pl>ql and m≥W0,
1 pl≤ql,
(31)
where fl(x)=1−
x∑
n=0
(
n+x−1
x−1
)
(pxl q
n
l −pn−1l qx+1l ), and the
average cumulative weight of honest payment at the end of
adaptation period in H2LR is W0 =
Lh−1∑
i=1
P{i,2}× i, where
P{i,2} = P {W (Lh−2)= i, L(Lh−2)=2 |W (0)=1, L(0)=Lh },
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Fig. 11: The probability of a successful attack using expected value vs.
distribution function
i=1, 2, · · · , Lh − 1.
The result in Fig. 11 shows that using expected value to
evaluate the probability of a successful attack is feasible.
L2HR: Similar with LR, the DAG based ledger can be
also treated as a single chain in this regime due to the
honest payment is indirectly approved by all tips at T1. The
expression of the probability to conduct a successful attack in
this regime is similar to equation (29) but with ph and qh,
which is shown as follows.
P{attack succeeds in L2HR}
=
 1−
m∑
n=0
(
n+m−2
m−2
)
(pm−1h q
n
h−pn−2h qm+1h ), ph>qh,
1, ph≤qh.
(32)
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of
DAG consensus process in terms of cumulative weight and
confirmation delay. Meanwhile, we show the probability of a
successful double-spending attack in different load regimes.
A. Cumulative Weight and Confirmation Delay
In the first experiment, let hr = 1(s), m = 100, λh = 50
and λl=0.5. We examine the cumulative weight growth of an
observed transaction based on performance analysis.
Fig. 12 shows the growth trend of cumulative weight for
an observed transaction under various load regimes. The sim-
ulation results are obtained by using the Poisson interarrival
times of new transactions, and analytical results are calculated
by using average interarrival times. It is clear to see that
the simulation results match well with their analytical results,
which indicates the rightness and effectiveness of the proposed
model. We can see that the cumulative weights for all load
regimes increase over time, since the new transactions arrive
continuously, and select tips to indirectly approve unconfirmed
transactions. The result of HR and that of LR are given as
a contrast to reflect the impact of network load as follows.
Although the arrival rate λh in L2HR and HR are the same,
we can see that L2HR achieves m faster than HR. This is
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Fig. 13: Confirmation delay (log scale) vs. λ
because the initial number of tips in HR is much larger than
that in L2HR, which results in a lower probability to select
the observed transaction in HR, and thus a lower growth rate.
Meanwhile, although the arrival rates are the same (λl) in
LR and H2LR, we can see that LR outperforms H2LR. The
reason is that adaptation period that is discussed in HR also
exists in H2LR. In this period, the observed transaction has not
been indirectly approved by all the tips, and thus the growth
rate of cumulative weight in H2LR would be lower than λl
until the adaptation period ends. In contrast, the growth rate
of cumulative weight in LR is λl all the time, since without
adaptation period, all new transactions will indirectly approve
the observed transaction.
In the second experiment, we vary new transaction arrival
rate to compare the confirmation delay under different load
regimes with m=50 and m=200, respectively. In H2LR, we
set the initial number of tips Lh = 100.
Fig. 13 shows the confirmation delay of an observed trans-
action under various load regimes, we can see that hr = 1
can be seemed as a boundary between low and high network
loads, where the performance of LR and H2LR are shown in
λ ∈ [0, 1], and the performance of HR and L2HR are shown
in λ∈ [1, 100]. The result demonstrates that the confirmation
delay decreases with the increasing arrival rate. Meanwhile,
for a given m, we can see the confirmation delay in H2LR is
higher than LR and the confirmation delay in HR is higher
than L2HR due to the impact of adaptation period, which
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Fig. 14: The probability of a successful attack in HR and L2HR (log scale)
matches well with the result in Fig. 12. When m changes from
50 to 200, the confirmation delay for all regimes increases.
Meanwhile, the confirmation delay of unsteady regimes moves
close to steady regimes due to a lower ratio of adaptation
period to the whole consensus process. Moreover, we could
notice that the confirmation delay in HR does not decrease
linearly with increasing λ. This is because a higher λ can
result in a larger W (t0)= 2λhr0.704 . Based on equation (11), when
m ≤ W (t0), the observed transaction would be confirmed
during adaptation period, and λ plays no role in this case.
The rationality behind this is the higher λ, the more number of
tips based on L=2λhr, and thus the probability to select the
observed transaction would decrease. So when m ≤ W (t0),
even if the new transactions arrive faster, the confirmation
delay would not decrease. Furthermore, with the increasing of
W (t0)=
2λhr
0.704 , the curve of m=50 in HR reaches the lower
bound of confirmation delay faster than that of m=200.
B. Probability of A Successful Attack
The following experiments are to examine the security. Let
λh = 50 and λl = 0.5, and thus Lh = 2λhhr = 100. We
investigate the probability of a successful attack under steady
and unsteady regimes based on network load.
In the third experiment, we examine the probability of a
successful attack in HR and L2HR by varying transaction ar-
rival rate of attacker µ. Considering the confirmation threshold
m would result in different expressions in HR, which have
been discussed in equation (28), we set m = 50, 100 and
150 based on the average cumulative weight at the end of
adaptation period W (t0)= Lh0.704≈142. As a contrast, we also
use the same m in L2HR to illustrate the impact of adaptation
period on the probability of a successful attack.
The result in Fig. 14 shows that when λ>µ, the probability
of a successful attack increases with µ, and it is identically
equal to 1 when λ≤µ based on the Gambler’s Ruin problem.
For a given confirmation threshold m, the probability of a
successful attack in HR is higher than L2HR when λ > µ.
This is because HR has the adaptation period, and therefore,
the attacker can “stolen” the computational power of the trans-
actions that do not approve the honest payment by creating a
parasite chain upon it.
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Fig. 15: The probability of a successful attack in LR and H2LR (log scale)
Meanwhile, we notice that m = 50 and m = 100 in
HR have the same success probability due to W (t0) = 142.
According to equation (28), as long as m<W (t0), the honest
payment would be confirmed during adaptation period, and
thus T2 = Td. The attacker only needs outpace honest nodes
by one transaction. Except that, we can find that a higher m
would result in a lower probability of a successful attack when
the honest payment is confirmed during linear growth period.
The reason is that the higher m, the more transactions issued
by honest nodes from T2 to Td, and the harder for attacker to
outweigh honest chain since λ>µ.
Finally, we compare the probability of a successful attack
in H2LR with that in LR. The result in Fig. 15 shows that the
attacker could win with much less transaction arrival rate µ
compare with that in Fig. 14. This is because the transaction
arrival rate of honest nodes is very low in H2LR and LR, thus,
the cumulative weight of honest payment increases slowly.
This phenomenon indicates that the low network load is
harmful to the security. Meanwhile, Fig. 15 also reflects that
the higher m, the success probability between H2LR and LR
is closer. This means that a larger m can result in a lower ratio
of adaptation period to consensus process, which can reduce
the adverse impact of adaptation period on security.
In summary, our analyses and experimental results reflect
that the larger m can reduce the adverse impact of adaptation
period and decrease the probability of a successful attack in
any regimes. But on the other hand, a larger m will result in
a larger confirmation delay. Therefore, it is valuable to find
a suitable confirmation threshold m based on the trade-off
between security level and confirmation delay according to
the specific needs in practical scenario.
VIII. RELATED WORK
There are a few blockchains proposed based on DAG.
Byteball is one of them introduced in [13]. Compared with
Tangle, transaction fee is required for this consensus, which
is proportional to the size of added data. In [14], Hashgraph
is proposed for replicated state machines with guarantee of
Byzantine fault tolerance. Using gossip protocol, the partici-
pants in Hashgraph generate a DAG based ledger for recording
all the transactions, while achieving Byzantine agreement
through virtual voting algorithm.
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Involving buyers and sellers, game theory is a natural
approach to analyse the interaction and strategy design in
consensus process. In [19], the authors prove the existence
of Nash equilibria in a DAG-valued stochastic process where
a part of players try to optimize their strategies. In order
to address the security and privacy challenges in consortium
blockchain for energy trading, a credit-based payment scheme
using Stackelberg game to determine an optimal pricing strat-
egy is proposed in [20].
Moreover, serval theoretical mathematical models are pro-
posed to analyze the performance of blockchain. In [21], the
authors analyse signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio, transac-
tion transmission successful rate and throughput in blockchain-
enabled IoT systems. Based on the performance analysis,
the authors design an optimal node deployment algorithm
for maximizing transaction throughput. In [22], the authors
develop a stochastic model for the evolution and dynamics of
blockchain networks, which provides deeper understanding of
crucial design issues for difficulty-of-work, block generation
rate and adversarial attacks. In [23], the authors analyse the
strategies of a selfish Bitcoin miner with a block withholding
attack, and quantitatively measure the total gain following
different attacking strategies. As the most related work, in
[12], the author analyses how fast does the cumulative weight
typically grow in the steady load regimes. This work provides
some insights into the qualitative and quantitative behaviors
of Tangle performance based on random tips selection.
Double-spending attack analysis is critical to a decentralized
system. In [1], the author studies the require computational
power for launching a double-spending attack in Bitcoin
system by using Poisson distribution and Gambler’s Ruin
problem. However, due to the time for the honest nodes to find
six blocks is variable, the Poisson distribution method relying
on a constant time is not efficient enough. To improve this
method, [11] uses negative binomial distribution to replace the
Poisson distribution method, which involves the randomness of
confirmation delay. After that, [22] summarizes four methods
for double-spending. The authors involve the impact of net-
work delay by extending the model proposed in [11]. Different
from these work, [24] focuses on the double-spending attack of
fast payments in Bitcoin, where the merchant can give service
without waiting for the transaction confirmation as long as the
value of transaction is not high. The probability of a successful
attack on fast payments relates to the broadcast latency among
the nodes in the network.
The above double-spending analysis are all based on PoW.
For DAG consensus, [25] examines the expected number of
tips by formulating the tips selection algorithm as a “balls
into bins” problem. Then, the author simply studies the
attack strategy for random and MCMC selection algorithms
respectively. However, the balls into bins method is not precise
enough, since it conflicts with the fact that a new transaction
cannot select one tip twice. Meanwhile, the author does not
consider the impact of adaptation period on the attack strategy.
As another work for DAG, [26] discusses the parasite chain ab-
sorption probabilities in Tangle using two-way Markov chain
Model. The author in this work focuses on the relationship
between cumulative weight and MCMC algorithm rather than
the probability of a successful double-spending attack.
Existing performance analyses for DAG consensus, e.g.,
[12] and [25], are only rely on steady load regimes where
the transaction arrival rate is unchanged in consensus pro-
cess. However, the network load in practical IoT network is
changeable. The Markov chain proposed in this work can
capture the dynamic behavior of consensus process under
unsteady network load regimes. Meanwhile, the cumulative
weight growth under unsteady network load regimes and the
confirmation delay have not been studied in previous work. For
the security of DAG consensus mechanism, we consider the
adverse impact of adaptation period on the security, where the
attack can optimize the strategy by using the computational
power of honest nodes. To the best of our knowledge, it
is the first time to mathematically analyse and discuss the
performance and security of DAG consensus by considering
the impact of network load.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we use Markov chain model to formulate the
consensus process of DAG based blockchain. By identifying
four load regimes, our model can capture the dynamic chang-
ing of the cumulative weight and the number of tips after a
new transaction revealed to the blockchain network. Based on
the model for DAG consensus process, we leverage theoretical
approach for evaluating the impact of the network load on the
key performance metrics in terms of cumulative weight and
confirmation delay with non-attack situation. After that, we
involve a typical double-spending attack in consensus process,
and use a stochastic model to examine the probability for
launching a successful attack under the four load regimes. By
conducting numerical simulations, the results demonstrate that
the proposed Markov chain model could reflect the features
of DAG consensus process under different load regimes accu-
rately, and this can provide an analytical guideline for building
optimal and secure DAG based blockchains in the future.
Compared with PoW and PoS, the impact of network
load is a common issue in DAG consensuses (e.g., Tangle,
Byteball and Hashgraph), which has been thoroughly analyzed
in this work. However, we cannot directly apply the proposed
mathematical models to other DAG based blockchains due
to the differences of the characteristics among the consensus
processes. Nevertheless, the studied problem and designed
analysis approach can serve as a foundation for future re-
search of other DAG consensuses. For example, Byteball
and Hashgraph have the main chain convergence and famous
witnesses election in consensus process respectively. The main
chain convergence and famous witnesses election play a key
role on system performance and will be directly affected by
network load. These topics have not been discussed and can
be considered as the future work of DAG consensuses.
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